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
Discussion of Lamla and Vinogradov Central Bank Announcements: Big News for Little People?

> Bundesbank – Banque de France Joint Conference on Household Expectations Frankfurt, 26-28 September 2019


#### Main conclusions

- (1) Irrelevance result no impact of announcements on either beliefs or confidence of consumers
- (2) press-conferences trigger better outreach: more consumers receive information about the FED.


Our main <u>irrelevance</u> result – no impact of announcements on either beliefs or confidence of consumers - indicatres <u>poor</u> <u>efficiency</u> of the existing policy communication regime, in stark contrast with how markets and professionals react to announcements.




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
Not much seems to happen on FOMCs covered by the analysis. When something happens, it may require either upward or downward revisions of expectations.

Main specification imposes instead strong restrictions.

 $\pi_i^e = \alpha + \beta_A A + \gamma \Delta i + \theta A \Delta i + \epsilon_i$ 

Announcements have same effect irrespective of actual news content (sign and size).

 $\Delta i$  is change in FED funds rate, largely anticipated especially during long awaited tightening cycle.



Surveyed consumers do respond differently at different FOMCs.

 $\Delta \pi/S \rightarrow$  What if these differences are related to actual market based measures of MP surprises? Would we learn more?

Our main <u>irrelevance</u> result – no impact of announcements on either beliefs or confidence of consumers - indicatres <u>poor</u> <u>efficiency</u> of the existing policy communication regime, in stark contrast with how markets and professionals react to announcements.

Maybe too strong a statement given the evidence.

Absence of revisions as well as of major market responses to tightening cycle may actually signal the contrary: exit from the ZLB has been accompanied with effective communication that has allowed a smooth adjustment avoiding large sudden shocks.

The good news is that press-conferences indeed trigger better outreach: more consumers receive information about the FED.

NewsExp<sub>i</sub> = 
$$\alpha + \beta A_i + \varepsilon_i$$
  
 $\beta = 0.098(***)$   
 $\pi_i = \mu + \theta \text{NewsExp}_i + \upsilon_i$   
 $\theta = -0.234(***)$ 

a) News exposure increases after FOMCsb) Expectations differ if exposed to news

However, econometric specification not much informative

$$\pi_i^e = \alpha + \beta_A A + \gamma News + \theta A * News + \epsilon_i$$

because once again, same effects across FOMCs and likely endogeneity of news exposure.

### Suggestion

Yet, interesting setup to study *causal* effect of news exposure on individual assessments of current and expected  $\pi$  and *r*.

 $y_{i} = \mu + \theta_{D} NewsExp_{i} + \upsilon_{i}$   $NewsExp_{i} = \alpha + \beta_{D}A_{i} + \varepsilon_{i}$ 

You can estimate FOMC-specific  $\theta_D$  and relate them to features of relevant FOMC (MP surprise sign and size, market responses, broad uncertainty, etc) to learn how and when news exposure *causally affect* variables of interest.

<u>Identifying hp</u>: announcements per se do not directly affect  $y_i$ ; they do so only by increasing media coverage of FED decisions and economic matters.

The good news is that press-conferences indeed trigger better outreach: more consumers receive information about the FED.

This actually is *better* news: your research design can be quite helpful at understanding the learning process, how consumers filter incoming information to form their assessments

#### My conclusions

Promising material to shed light on relevant issues.

Smooth out some strong statements on the effectiveness of FED communication policies.

Look at the data also from a slightly different angle.

