

# Discussion of

## Silvia Miranda-Agrippino and Giovanni Ricco

### The Transmission of Monetary Policy Shocks

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The views expressed here are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the

views of the ECB or the Eurosystem

## Contributions


- ▶ HFI meets the Romers: New instrument for MP shocks
  - ▶ High-frequency surprise (Kuttner, 2001; Gertler and Karadi, 2015) purged from the effects of
    - ▶ Past surprises
    - ▶ Fed staff forecasts (Romer and Romer, 2004)

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- ▶ HFI meets the Romers: New instrument for MP shocks
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    - ▶ Past surprises
    - ▶ Fed staff forecasts (Romer and Romer, 2004)
- ▶ Why? Information frictions
  - ▶ Slow information acquisition/processing
  - ▶ CB private information about the outlook
  - ▶ Policy actions reveal them

# Contributions, cont.

► Impact traced out in a SVAR-IV



## Contributions, cont.

- ▶ New framework: Bayesian Local Projection
  - ▶ VAR and LP on population: same normalized impulse responses (up to  $p$ ) (Plagborg-Moller and Wolf, 2018)
  - ▶ In finite samples: unclear, depends on the DGP
  - ▶ New proposal: LP with VAR priors and optimized weight

## Comments

- ▶ Big fan
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- ▶ Comments
  - ▶ Noisy information in financial markets
  - ▶ Transfer of CB private information: action or talk?
  - ▶ Do it for (some) other countries (UK?)

# Noisy information in financial markets

► HFI surprises not autocorrelated

	$FF4_t$	$FF4_t^\dagger$	$FF4_t^{GK}$
instrument $_{t-1}$	0.065 (0.090)	-0.164*** (0.057)	0.380*** (0.137)
instrument $_{t-2}$	-0.025 (0.119)	-0.048 (0.066)	-0.164** (0.073)
instrument $_{t-3}$	0.145 (0.130)	-0.066 (0.073)	0.308** (0.150)
instrument $_{t-4}$	0.179* (0.105)	-0.007 (0.068)	-0.035 (0.094)
constant	-0.016*** (0.005)	-0.011*** (0.004)	-0.011*** (0.003)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.001	0.168
F	1.459	2.279	2.965
p	0.217	0.063	0.021
N	167	167	166



## Noisy information in financial markets, cont.

- ▶ HFI surprises not autocorrelated
  - ▶ Including  $FF4^{GK}$  is cheap: time-aggregation mechanically creates autocorrelation
  - ▶ FF4 is not autocorrelated on the full sample,
  - ▶ or weakly (only at 10% level) with a *negative* sign on scheduled days

## Transfer of CB private information

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public filters from interest rate changes (see also Romer and Romer, 2000; Melosi, 2017; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018)

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public filters from interest rate changes (see also Romer and Romer, 2000; Melosi, 2017; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2018)
- ▶ Alternative: through contemporaneous talk: press statements (Jarocinski and Karadi, 2018)

## A policy announcement: March 20, 2001, 2:15pm

The Federal Open Market Committee at its meeting today decided to lower its target for the federal funds rate by 50 basis points to 5 percent. [...]

Although current developments do not appear to have materially diminished the prospects for long-term growth in productivity, excess productive capacity has emerged recently. [...] the risks are weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate economic weakness in the foreseeable future.

Market response: both interest rates and stock prices decline  
(bad news)

## Transfer of CB private information, cont.

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## Transfer of CB private information, cont.

- ▶ Authors' identification presupposes: the public learns the CB private information
- ▶ Fitted values cause information shocks
- ▶ Suggests 'information shocks' independent of monetary policy shocks (comp. information channel).


## Transfer of CB private information, cont.

- ▶ Alternative route (Jarocinski and Karadi, 2018)
  - ▶ Identify shocks from the HF comovement of interest rates and stock prices
  - ▶ Identification from what market received (not what info the CB had)



# Transfer of CB private information, cont.

- ▶ Strikingly similar results



## Transfer of CB private information, cont.

### ► Despite not measuring the same thing

Variables	FF4	MP shock	CB info shock
$\pi_t$	0.00203 (0.330)	0.00209 (0.383)	0.000288 (0.0660)
$\pi_{t+1}$	0.00623 (0.474)	0.00163 (0.201)	0.00497 (0.776)
$\pi_{t+2}$	-0.00799 (-0.835)	-0.00514 (-0.849)	-0.00363 (-0.717)
$dy_t$	0.0181*** (2.893)	0.0183*** (3.119)	-0.00141 (-0.388)
$dy_{t+1}$	0.0140 (1.379)	0.000733 (0.0886)	0.0143*** (3.078)
$dy_{t+2}$	-0.00758 (-0.891)	-0.00220 (-0.341)	-0.00671 (-1.643)
$u_t$	-0.0279 (-0.630)	-0.0256 (-0.796)	-0.00629 (-0.296)
Observations	180	180	180
R-squared	0.117	0.116	0.070

Robust t-statistics in parentheses

## Transfer of CB private information, cont.

- ▶ Future research
  - ▶ Identify the channels of information transmission
  - ▶ Text analysis (issue: expected text)
  - ▶ Combination of text analysis and market responses

## Other countries?

- ▶ Clear test of the methodology
  - ▶ Similar results in other countries?
  - ▶ Euro area: private info no predictive power
  - ▶ What about UK?

# Conclusion

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  - ▶ Credible identification of monetary policy shocks
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# Conclusion

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  - ▶ Credible identification of monetary policy shocks
  - ▶ Clear evidence on the information channel
  - ▶ Useful new method: Bayesian Local Projections
- ▶ Comments
  - ▶ No evidence for slow information diffusion at financial markets
  - ▶ Information shock, rather than information channel
  - ▶ Would be great to repeat it for other countries

## References I

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